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Summary 
 
Bachelor's Dissertation in Business Administration. University of Gothenburg, School of 
Business, Economics and Law. Bachelor´s Thesis, Financial Accounting, Spring 2015.  
 
Authors: Jessica Axenbrant and Emma Håkansson 
Supervisor: Andreas Hagberg 
 
Title: Earnings Management in Private Swedish Companies - A Study of the Contributing Factors.  
 
Background and problem: Due to a large number of accounting scandals the academic term 
earnings management has become more known to the world in recent years, which has lead to an 
increased demand for further research on this subject. The research questions of this thesis are the 
following; To what extent do private limited companies in Sweden manage their earnings? How 
do the following factors affect the existence of earnings management in private limited Swedish 
companies; industry, debt to equity ratio and choice of audit firm? 
 
Purpose: To inform the reader on the existence of earnings management in private limited 
companies in Sweden and what can affect its existence by analyzing more than 45 000 
observations through a population study. Also, this thesis serves to add to the previous fairly vague 
research in the private sector area and to create awareness for all stakeholders about these 
problems.  
 
Limitations: This population study will examine 5 341 private limited Swedish companies with 
complete financial information for the years 2005-2013. Only financial information from Business 
Retriever will be analyzed and not individual financial reports.    
 
Method: The method and tests will be based on the earnings distribution method presented by 
Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), by analyzing the distribution of earnings in the 
positive area of a weighted net income of zero through the main test. Thereafter a sub test will 
analyze the association of the previously mentioned chosen factors with the existence of earnings 
management.  
 
Results and conclusion: The main results show an irregular distribution of earnings among the 
companies analyzed around zero, implying that these companies manage their earnings to 
overcome losses due to several reasons. We have found evidence that these companies are 
associated with specific industries and the usage of a not Big Four audit firm. No relation between 
these companies and their respective level of debt to equity has been found.   
 
Proposal for future research: We propose future research to be made in the area by evaluating 
the correlation between industry size and significance, evaluate the correlation between earnings 
 4 
management and audit firm on an individual level (EY, Deloitte, KPMG, PWC) and on the 
relation between earnings management and level of debt to equity by using the second as a binary 
variable.  
 
Keywords: earnings management, private vs public companies, creative accounting, Big Four 
audit firm, debt to equity ratio, industry, earnings distribution  
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1. Introduction 
 
The first chapter will provide a background and purpose of the study and thereafter present the 
research questions, which will be answered in the end of the thesis.  
 
1.1 Background 
Accounting forms a central element of every company's success or failure. Therefore it is 
important to understand the risks with accounting and the factors behind business scandals arising 
and whether it is possible to anticipate them before they happen (Jones, M, 2011). Stakeholders 
evaluate how well or bad a company is doing by the information presented in the financial reports. 
This makes it more tempting for managers to use flexible accounting techniques to produce 
financial reports which reflects a misleading picture of the company’s activities and financial 
position (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
 
The academic word for this phenomenon is earnings management and has become more known to 
the world in recent years when several accounting scandals have been observed. One of the biggest 
scandals in recent years occurred as a result of misleading numbers reported by the company 
Enron, at the time the seventh largest company in the US, which reported a 100 billion revenue the 
year before its bankruptcy in 2001. Enron was later brought to trial where various individuals were 
found guilty for fraud. There are also Swedish examples of this, where one of the most recent ones 
involved the company Prosolvia, which with the use of different accounting techniques 
manipulated their financial reports through a reconstruction of ownership, invented agreements 
and premature income recognition (Jones, M, 2011).  
 
Accounting scandals and fraud are repetitive in history and in every country, however are by 
nature extreme cases but generally involve creative accounting such as earnings management  
(Jones, M, 2011). Companies have different reasons for managing earnings, which include 
presenting consistent results between years, maximizing their performance or in an attempt to 
receive a zero result to avoid profit tax (Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker, 2003). 
 
Previous studies on the presence of earnings management in both public and private companies 
have shown that it does occur but that the outcomes vary and they are sometimes contradictory. 
Factors which have been examined in previous research are contracting motivations, ownership 
structure, tax incentives, debt to equity ratio, the presence of bonus systems, type of audit firm, 
industry and profitability (Healy, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Phillips et al. 2003; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Guidry et al. 1999; Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Healy and Whalen, 
1999). This thesis will only analyze a sample of these factors and will exclude factors, which are 
only relevant in the examination of public companies. 
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1.2 Purpose 
This thesis aims to examine the existence of earnings management in Swedish private limited 
companies and factors, which may affect its existence during the last nine years. This population 
study present exclusive data of more than 5 000 companies and 48 000 observations.  
 
Public companies have been the main focus in previous studies because of their relevance to the 
mass and because they are all obliged to publish public financial reports. In Sweden both public 
and private limited companies publish financial reports and not only are the shareholders 
concerned about the company (Årsredovisningslagen, SFS 1995:1554). Also, according to the 
principle of public access to official documents, the documents of the government and government 
agencies are official and Swedish people have the right to study these public documents 
(Government Offices of Sweden, 2015).  
 
According to Mitchell et al. (1997) stakeholders such as lenders, employees, customers and 
suppliers are concerned with the financial situation of the company. This point of view together 
with research by Burgstahler et al. (2006) which implies that private companies engage more in 
earnings management compared to public companies have increased the demand for greater 
quality of the financial reports in private companies. Examining motives and factors for using 
earnings management in private companies can according to Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) 
help alleviate agency conflicts between owners, managers and banks. It can also be useful for 
evaluation of managerial performance or for convincing various stakeholders of the credibility of 
the financial statements. 
 
The search for the existence of previous research in this area shows that the supply is fairly vague. 
There are not many studies to be found on research on private limited Swedish companies and 
whether they manage their earnings. However, in a research called The Importance of Reporting 
Incentives: Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms by Burgstahler et al. 
(2006), it is shown that earnings management is more existent in private firms. This is also the 
conclusion Ball and Shivakumar (2005) make in their research where they compare private and 
public companies in the UK. However, in a research made by Beatty et al. (2002) on private and 
public banks, the findings were that the earnings quality was lower in public companies. This 
implies that the results vary and that further research on the subject is necessary.  
 
A few studies can also be found on an European basis, such as the study Earnings Management 
and Audit Quality in Europe: Evidence from the Private Client Segment Market by Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2008). This contribution adds to the above research and they mainly test the 
restrictions of earnings management in the presence of a Big Four audit firm with a sample of six 
European countries. Due to lack of information on audit firms, Sweden had to be excluded in this 
study and could not be analyzed. The above research by Burgstahler et al. (2006) also come to the 
same conclusion regarding audit firm data; that they fail to collect it from Sweden. This factor is 
relevant due to the audit firm's duty to prevent earnings management in form of representation of 
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false or misleading information. Therefore it is relevant to add to this research with help of 
complete Swedish audit firm data.      
 
There have also been some studies in more adjacent countries, which reach the conclusion that 
earnings management is existent in private companies. One of them is a Norwegian thesis by 
Reksten and Kristiansen (2011) who from a sample of approx. 1.5 Million private limited 
Norwegian companies come to the following conclusion; earnings are managed to overcome small 
losses in companies´ financial reports and that these companies do not use a Big Four audit firm. 
Furthermore, a Finnish paper by Sundgren (2007), Earnings Management in Public and Private 
Companies - Evidence from Finland, also explores this existence in approx. 200 companies and 
these findings in relation to debt to equity ratio, where the author finds a correlation between 
companies with a high debt to equity ratio and the usage of income increasing accounting 
methods. Equivalent studies on Swedish companies have not been found.    
 
Among the different factors, which might affect the outcome of earnings management, the 
research on the correlation between earnings management and industry is, according to the authors 
of this thesis, nearly non-existent. Some studies, however, on earnings management in general 
also, as a complement, show its existence among different industries. An Australian research made 
by Sun and Rath (2009) only focuses on this correlation. They found that, out of nine industrial 
groups, earnings management was present in the following; Energy, Metal & mining, Industries, 
Healthcare, Information technology & telecommunications and Utilities industries. The study 
analyzed companies from 2000-2006 and also came to the conclusion that the companies, which 
managed their earnings, were less profitable and smaller than the companies, which did not.  
 
With this information on different areas of research and their relevance of comparison, this thesis 
will analyze the influence of these factors on the existence of earnings management, i.e. type of 
audit firm, the level of debt to equity and industry. This thesis´ point of view is relevant and aims 
to inform and spread knowledge to the stakeholders of limited private companies in Sweden, and 
assist them in decision-making. It will contribute with results in an area, which seems to be quite 
unexplored.  
 
1.3 Problem formulation and research questions 
This thesis will aim to answer the following research questions; 
 
● To what extent do private limited companies in Sweden manage their earnings? 
● How do the following factors affect the existence of earnings management in private 
limited companies in Sweden; industry, debt to equity ratio and type of audit firm? 
 
The first question constitutes our main concern where an affirmative answer is required in order to 
answer the second question. If the first question shows an existence of earnings management we 
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will be able to continue the investigation and examine the factors contributing to earnings 
management. To be able to answer the questions we will set out hypotheses, which will be 
examined through a visual and statistical test. The first test will be based upon methods from 
previous research and studies were the distribution of earnings is the most important evidence for 
earnings management. The second test is a regression analysis test, which will examine if there is a 
relationship between earnings management and the chosen factors. From the results we will be 
able to either reject or not reject the hypotheses.  
1.4 Thesis´ continued disposition  
The following chapters will discuss previous research, different methods used to detect earnings 
management and the choice of method for this thesis. Furthermore, the report will with the use of 
statistical tests in form of a regression analysis examine the existence of earnings management and 
its contributing factors. Finally we will discuss and analyze the result and a conclusion will be 
made together with proposals for future research. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical framework  
 
The theoretical framework aims to give the reader a closer look into the subject and previous 
research. First, an explanation, which includes the definition of a private limited company and 
different types of creative accounting, will be made. Later in this chapter we will introduce and 
discuss a few theories on which we have based our thesis, explaining reasons and factors behind 
manipulating figures in financial reports. Previous research and a conclusion with comparison of 
the different methods will end this chapter and give the reader enough information to understand 
the following chapters. 
 
2.1 Private companies in Sweden 
In Sweden, a private company must have at least 50 000 SEK in share capital. This amount was 
previously 100 000 but was reduced in 2010 in order to attract more limited companies to be 
established (Government Offices of Sweden, 2013). Partly due to this shift, 188 646 private 
limited companies were registered in Sweden between 2010 and 2015. This can be compared to 
the smaller number of 91390 private limited companies, which were registered between 2005 and 
2010. This is an increase with more than 200 % (Business Retriever, 2015).  
 
Due to this increase in private limited companies, the result has been an increase in the number of 
mandatory financial reports. According to the Swedish Årsredovisningslagen all limited 
companies, economic associations, partnerships and companies and parent companies in concerns, 
which meet more than one of the following requirements; 
 the average number of employees has during the last two fiscal years been more than 50 
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 the company's published balance sheet total has during the last two fiscal years been more 
than 40 million SEK 
 the company's published net sales has during the last two fiscal years been more than 80 
million SEK  
must create an annual report according to the rules of Årsredovisningslagen (SFS 1995:1554, 6 
chap, 1 §).  
 
The increase in the number of financial reports may also increase the existence of incentives to 
manipulate these reports. Therefore, the different types of creative accounting techniques will be 
presented next.  
2.2 Different types of creative accounting 
Griffiths (1986) describe creative accounting as being widely used and recognized; arguing that 
this way of “fiddling the accounts” is perfectly legitimate. The incentives of using creative 
accounting come from the growing pressure on companies to report favorable results. This 
pressure partly originates from the great and powerful institutional investors. Due to these 
misleading numbers and reports, creditors and suppliers may deal with businesses which otherwise 
would be evaluated as too risky if the reports had presented truthful information. It is also argued 
that private companies have the same, if not greater incentives to shape their accounts into looking 
more attractive. Because of the fact that stakeholders do not possess the exclusive private 
information of the company, there is an existing information asymmetry between them and their 
shareholders (Richardson, 2000). Therefore, they must rely only on the reports to make 
assumptions about the company's financial position (Palepu et al., 2004).  
 
The different levels of creative accounting can be divided into aggressive accounting, earnings 
management, profit smoothing and fraud, dependent of the degree of creativity. Jones, M (2011) 
defines aggressive accounting as nearly the same as creative accounting; it’s a set of chosen 
techniques to achieve a specific managerial objective, such as increased earnings, rather than 
presenting a true and fair view.  
 
The next term, earnings management, is academic and there have been numerous papers written on 
many aspects of the subject all over the world. The definition by Healy and Whalen (1999) is 
broadly used and describes the phenomenon like this: 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
 
There is sometimes a thin line between legitimate and proper accounting choices and different 
forms of earnings management (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). Companies prefer to report steady 
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year-on-year growth rather than confronting the market with volatile profits, known as profit 
smoothing. Managers might therefore use creative accounting to smooth profits by cutting down 
high profits and increase poor profits (Jones, M, 2011). The last, and perhaps the most drastic, 
level of accounting is fraud and the essential difference between fraud and creative accounting is 
that fraud is working outside the regulatory framework. It is not easy to distinguish fraud from 
creative accounting and the boundary has not been clear in practice. The Swedish definition of 
fraud can sometimes make it difficult to distinguish which form of accounting techniques lie 
within the regulatory framework and which do not. Swedish law describe fraud like this:  
 
“Whoever by misleading conduct brings someone into action or failure, which imply winning for 
the perpetrator and loss for the mislead person or someone in its place, will be sentenced to prison 
for a maximum of two years for fraud. Also, whoever gives wrong or incomplete information, 
through modification of programs or recording or in any other way unlawfully influence the result 
of an automatic information treatment process or any other similar automatic process, which 
implies winning for the perpetrator and harm for someone else.” (Brottsbalken, SFS 1962:700).  
 
These definitions and explanations will lie as a basis for the following theories and research.   
 
2.2.1 The thresholds 
Degeorge, Patel, Zeckhauser (1999) present behavioral thresholds for earnings management and a 
model which explains how these thresholds generate different forms of earnings management. 
Empirical studies have come to the conclusion that earnings management works to top one out of 
three thresholds; sustain latest performance, meet the expectations of analysts and to show positive 
results. The last one is the dominating one. Hayn (1995) discusses that companies manage their 
earnings in order to “cross the red line” and to locate themselves not below, but just over the zero. 
The limit will in this thesis be a earnings of zero and therefore this theory may help explain why 
the observed companies lie within a specific interval of earnings or not.  
2.2.2 The prospect theory 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), this theory can be one explanation to the use of 
earnings management. It explains that companies gain the greatest utility when they move from a 
relative or absolute loss to a gain. It means that managers do not obtain merit from losses and 
gains not in relation to a level of wealth, which is absolute, but from a specific reference point. 
This suggests that, for example, at a set growth in wealth the value expansion is the largest when 
by the time that the individual´s wealth rises from a loss to a gain in relation to a reference point. If 
the objectives of the stakeholders correspond with this theory, then there is an incentive for the 
manager to want to announce earnings which top the reference point, as in zero earnings or the 
threshold in order to achieve greater benefits. This reference point will in this thesis be earnings of 
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zero. Therefore, the companies receive the greatest value when moving from negative to positive 
earnings, and not just when their earnings increase.  
2.3 Previous research 
The research on earnings management has developed since the 1960s and in the beginning this 
research focused on the capital markets. In this early research the Mechanistic Hypothesis was 
used when evaluating the correlation of earnings management and capital markets. The 
Mechanistic Hypothesis express that investors may be wrongly informed by the judgment of a 
company's accounting when only having to rely on companies´ financial reports. However, when 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) developed Positive Accounting Theory the research focus moved 
from capital markets to incentives related to internal contracts. This theory provided the public 
with a review of the theory and methods, which lie as a basis for accounting literature. The non-
capital market focus during the 80s and 90s included incentives to manage earnings as being 
enhancement of management compensation and reduction of political costs and debt covenant 
violations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  
 
There are many recognized methods, which can be used when measuring the existence of earnings 
management. McNichols (2000) reports on three commonly used research designs in earnings 
management literature and define them as; those based on earnings distribution, those based on 
aggregated accruals and those based on specific accruals. Due to lack of motives and knowledge in 
the accruals area and therefore a risk of misleading conclusions, the paper concludes that the 
distribution-based and specific accruals based methods will provide more reliable information in 
the future. The distribution-based design shows the existence of earnings management and how 
much it is used; however it does not tell in what way.    
 
Many different methods have derived from the accruals area and the most commonly used 
accruals-based models analyze, according to Chen (2010), the discretionary parts of companies´ 
reported income. These include the Healy model (1985), the DeAngelo model (1986), the Jones 
model (1991) and the modified Jones model (modified by Dechow 1995). The Healy model 
undertakes the assumption that the value of the expected non-discretionary accruals is zero and 
that if then the value of the total accruals is non-zero, earnings management is occurring. The 
DeAngelo model takes another approach and assumes that the non-discretionary accruals instead 
do a random walk and describes it as the difference between the non-discretionary accruals in 
period t and t-1, which also equals the discretionary accruals associated with earnings 
management. The Jones model uses the variance of fixed assets and revenue as variables, 
independent from each other, to forecast the discretionary accruals. This is because it is believed 
that revenue variations lead to operating capital variations, which cause accruals changes, and the 
fixed assets depreciations then decrease the accruals (Al-Saeed and Riesheh, 2014). The modified 
Jones model, however, is currently the most recognized according to Chen (2010).  
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Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) analyze the accrual-based models and come to the conclusion 
that the accrual-based methods are more useful and detailed when used on randomly selected 
years. This is a setback to our research based on the fact that we will examine exactly the last nine 
years (2005-2013). The authors finish by crediting the modified Jones-model (1991) as most 
powerful when detecting earnings management. This is also the opinion of Islam (2011) who 
considers this model to have the most power, however his research specifically focuses on the 
usage of this model in developed countries.  
 
Gerakos (2012) argues against the existing methods due to their belief that discretionary accruals 
show on either poor quality earnings or earnings management, assuming that the residual from a 
linear regression equals earnings management. The author also reports that these methods struggle 
with measurement errors, leading to type 1 and 2 errors as in the rejection of a correct null 
hypothesis of no existence of earnings management and in the failure of rejecting an incorrect false 
null hypothesis of no existence of earnings management. The author instead promotes a novel 
method by Dechow, Hutton, Kim and Sloan (DHKS) (2012), which serves to identify earnings 
management based on accruals. The model depends on the idea that earnings management based 
on accruals in one period must be reversed in another period. Instead of assuming that the non-
discretionary accruals are a linear function of different company characteristics and test the level 
of discretionary accruals against a null hypothesis, this method does not take into account the 
matter of what the statistical properties of unmanaged accruals are but instead divide accruals into 
discretionary and non-discretionary sections. This model addresses many problems of the existing 
methods by capturing the dynamics of accruals reversals and therefore reduces the measurement 
errors. Their approach demands the user to know the period in which the earnings management 
occurs, rises and reverses, meaning that their method is only applicable when the existence of 
earnings management is known. However, if the information of existence of earnings management 
and time of its reversal is available the method can become more powerful and specific, even up to 
40 % more powerful if considering these reversals. Due to the requirement of this method to be 
aware of the existence of earnings management and that this thesis aims to explore a potential 
existence, this method may not deliver a reliable result of our observations.   
 
The earnings distribution approach is analyzed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge 
et.al. (1999). Earnings are seen as a measure of the company's performance by the users with the 
help of financial statements (Dechow, 1994). Stakeholders do not possess all the private 
information of the company and its income streams (Richardson, 2000). Therefore, there is an 
existing information asymmetry between them and the companies and the shareholders must rely 
only on the reports to make assumptions about the company's financial position (Palepu et al., 
2004). The approach is based on the assumption that companies manage losses and decreases in 
earnings by using earnings management. This method proposes that companies´ use earnings 
management to beat benchmarks, as in zero earnings and zero changes in earnings. The reports 
show an abnormally and unexpected small amount of earnings decreases and losses and an 
abnormally high amount of earnings increases and a positive income which is rather small in size 
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among the companies analyzed. This is analyzed from a perspective of cross-sectional distribution 
of earnings management. When earnings were increased, two factors were in this study used to 
manage earnings; changes in working capital and the cash flow from operations. There are two 
explanations why these earnings were managed, one is that managers do not want to report on 
these losses and decreases in earnings due the to high costs related to the transactions with their 
stakeholders. The other one refers to the assumption that managers are reluctant to relative or 
absolute losses. For example, the approach of pooled cross-sectional distribution identifies 
earnings management in comparison to forecasts. If the deviations of these distributions are 
smooth, then there is no matter of earnings management. If, however, there is a diversion in the 
distribution around zero, meaning that there will be fewer negative, yet small, deviations of 
earnings in relation to forecasts and a higher number of positive, yet small, deviations, the earnings 
have been managed. The result of this method will vary dependent on how the “goal”, for example 
the variables “prevention of losses and decreases in earnings”, is defined, and will after this 
definition have varying precision. The method bypasses the problems related to accruals-based 
methods and can instead help us make a strong prognosis about the existence of managed earnings, 
however not how they are performed or the incentives to beat benchmarks. One great benefit that 
the distribution of earnings method possesses is the ability to avoid many of the econometric 
problems, which may appear in the calculation of discretionary accruals (Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997). 
 
One of many previous researches in the earnings distribution area is presented by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) and compares private and public companies in the UK. They find evidence 
consistent with the assumption that the earnings quality displayed by private companies is lower 
than the quality of public companies. On the contrary, in a research by Beatty et al. (2002) on 
private and public banks, the findings were that the earnings quality was lower in public 
companies, reporting that public banks reported fewer small earnings declines and also tended to 
use the loan loss provision to eliminate these decreases. The same authors also explicate that these 
differences are limited to a particular country or industry. The difference between earnings 
management in private and public companies is also analyzed in a research called The Importance 
of Reporting Incentives: Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms by 
Burgstahler et al. (2006), which show that earnings management is more existent in private firms.  
 
The study Earnings Management and Audit Quality in Europe: Evidence from the Private Client 
Segment Market by Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) shows its existence in Europe. This one tests 
the correlation of earnings management and audit firm in a sample of six European countries. In 
more adjacent studies by Reksten and Kristiansen (2011) and Sundgren (2007), it is found that 
earnings are managed to overcome small losses, that these companies do not use a Big Four audit 
firm (Reksten and Kristiansen, 2011) and that there is a positive correlation between earnings 
management and debt to equity ratio (Sundgren, 2007).  
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Hayn (1995) came to the following conclusion after having analyzed companies using the earnings 
distribution method for a sample of 64 466 observations from US companies; there was a 
diversion around zero and especially a concentration directly above zero among the companies 
analyzed. At the same time, there was less than the expected frequency of small losses, i. e. just 
below zero. The observations just below and just above zero differ from the normal distribution at 
the 1 % significance level when using the binomial test. This propose that companies with 
earnings which risk falling below the point of zero earnings have more incentives to manage their 
earnings. It was later concluded in the study that 30-40 percent of the companies, which reported 
negative results between two periods, one before manipulation, adjusted their numbers to cross the 
“red line”. 
 
However, Dechow and Skinner (2000) report that academic research has not demonstrated that 
earnings management has a large effect on average on reported earnings.  
 
Therefore, the hypothesis for the first research question on the existence of earnings management 
is; 
 
● H1: Private companies manage earnings to avoid reporting a negative net income 
 
The next section will introduce the chosen factors, which may have an affect on this existence of 
earnings management and will be introduced in no particular order.  
 
2.4 Theory of factors affecting earnings management 
The following factors have been identified in previous research to influence the existence of 
earnings management and will therefore be examined further in this thesis.  
 
2.4.1 Industry 
Previous research have discussed that specific industries have a higher frequency of earnings 
management than others. A study made by Healy and Whalen (1999) revealed that earnings 
management has a positive correlation with companies within industry-specific regulatory 
constraints connected to accounting. This study is based on other studies like Collins et al. (1995) 
who studied a sample of banks, which are highly regulated in comparison to other industries. More 
than half of the sample showed some sort of earnings management, which may imply that when 
there is a higher level of constraint regulations within an industry, companies are more willing to 
manage their earnings.  
 
Another study focusing on industries was made by Sun and Rath (2009). The study examines the 
observations of 4 844 companies during a period of six years in Australia by using the Jones 
Model (accrual based) and the logistic regression analysis. They found evidence that the periphery 
sector which includes small and medium sized firms facing a high level of competition and earn 
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relatively low profits manage their earnings through an income increasing behavior to a higher 
extent than core sector firms. The periphery sector firms also have a more restricted opportunity 
structure and are exposed to a higher degree of business uncertainty, which may be the reason for 
the higher frequency of earnings management in these industries. The study has also come up with 
the specific results that there is a greater representation of earnings management within the 
following industries; Energy, Metal & mining, Industries, Healthcare, Information technology & 
telecommunications and Utilities industries.   
  
From previous research we can conclude that specific industries perform earnings management 
more than others. Even though the studies come to different conclusions they are not contradictory 
to each other. Therefore, the thesis in this area is the following; 
 
● H2: There is an association between companies within specific industries and the existence 
of earnings management within these companies 
 
2.4.2 Debt to equity ratio 
Watts et al. (1986) report on the debt to equity hypothesis, which implies that companies with a 
higher debt to equity ratio are more willing to report higher revenues. Managers manipulate 
earnings when in higher debt in order to reduce their risk aversion seen from an investor’s or a 
lender’s perspective. By keeping their credit rating they can avoid higher cost of capital, which 
implies a positive relationship between debt-to-equity ratio and the usage of earnings management. 
Deegan (2009) also discusses this hypothesis, meaning that managers tend to present more 
favorable financial statements to show a positive liquidity position in order to pay the company's 
debt principal and its interest. It also states that as this ratio increases, managerial motivations 
increase to present more favorable numbers by using various misleading accounting methods.  
 
Even though most studies indicate that high debt to equity ratio is correlated with earnings 
management, opposing researches exist. These researches imply that companies with a high debt 
to equity ratio might be more prone to manage their earnings to meet the requirements from 
lenders but they are also under more surveillance because of this (Defond och Jambalvo, 1994). 
Also, according to Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) companies with higher debt to equity ratio 
tend to use income increasing accounting methods to a greater extent.  
 
With this information, the following hypothesis will be examined;  
 
● H3: Level of debt to equity influence the existence of earnings management within 
companies 
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2.4.3 Audit firm 
Auditors are frequently mentioned in earnings management theories because of their mission to 
prevent and limit the presence of this phenomenon in financial reports. The auditor has to be 
independent and becomes the link between the customer and the customer´s stakeholders such as 
potential investors, suppliers or banks. (FAR, 2013). Because of their importance when it comes to 
earnings management there has been several studies on the subject. Most previous studies have in 
common that they focus on whether a company use one of the Big Four audit firms or not. 
However, the results of these studies vary. A study by Vander Bauwhede et al. (2003), imply that 
there is no positive correlation between not having a Big Four audit firm and earnings 
management. Other studies show that Big Four or Big Six audit firms limit earnings management 
more in comparison to other audit firms in both private and public companies (Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2008; DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et al. 1998). This relationship between private 
companies and Big Four audit firms arises partly due to the tax authorities since they take on the 
same role and examine the accounting in the same way as market stakeholder do for public 
companies, according to the authors. This increases the likelihood of detection of figures being 
manipulated even for private companies and Big Four auditors care more about their reputation 
and will therefore be more careful when controlling both private and public companies (Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen, 2008).  
 
We will be examining this area of research with the following hypothesis; 
 
● H4: Type of audit firm influence the existence of earnings management within companies 
 
2.5 Conclusion and comparison of theories   
Private limited companies in Sweden all make financial reports for their shareholders to analyze 
and use as basis for decision-making. The pressure on companies to report favorable results 
motivates creative accounting such as aggressive accounting, earnings management, profit 
smoothing and even fraud if there is a higher degree of creativity. Theories which explain 
incentives of companies to manage their earnings and the theory, which this thesis is build upon, 
argue that different types of creative accounting occur in favor to sustain latest performance, meet 
expectations of analysts and/or to show a positive result.  
 
The methods used to detect earnings management have been divided into three groups, were 
aggregated accruals have been the most frequently used one. This test model has some problems, 
which may affect the outcome because it is based on assumptions regarding accruals and 
incentives to manipulate results that differ from institutional beliefs. This problem can be solved 
when using specific categories of accruals since the conditions of using accounting regulations to 
understand accruals are easier with this method. Furthermore, accrual-based methods can give 
measurement errors, leading to rejection of a correct null hypothesis. The third method, earnings 
distribution after management was introduced by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), which only 
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indicate the existence of earnings management and to what extent. This dominant method is also 
presented by Hayn (1995) who says that earnings management occur in order for companies to 
“cross the red line”, which refers to ending up just above zero in earnings. The method, however, 
does not describe how earnings are managed, like the accrual-based methods. This last method is 
based on the assumption that earnings management exist if the distribution of earnings has a 
skewness around zero, meaning that there will be fewer negative earnings and a higher frequency 
of earnings just above zero. 
 
Previous research from these three methods above have all showed that earnings management 
exists in the analysed observations. However, factors, which may explain the existence of earnings 
management, have provided mixed results. Since this thesis only examine private companies only 
three out of several factors, which have being examined in previous research, will be analyzed in 
this thesis. The choice of factors affecting the existence of earnings management is based on 
studies made on private companies, which have shown a significant correlation with earnings 
management; type of industry, level of debt to equity ratio and audit firm.  
 
3. Method 
 
The method chapter aims to explain the method that will be used to answer our research 
questions. The background and content of the method will be discussed and definitions of the test 
variables will be presented. The goal is for the reader to understand how the results will be 
received by examining the different steps of the method, which in the end are the basis of the 
following main and sub test. 
 
This thesis is a secondary quantitative analysis and the selection is chosen systematically, which 
will be less timely and monetary costly. It will also have a deductive approach, which will proceed 
from theories and lead us to a result, proceeding from previous research (Bryman and Bell, 2014). 
It aims to examine the existence of earnings management and factors, which may affect its 
existence. To answer the research questions the chosen method will be divided into two tests. The 
first test aims to answer the question of whether private limited companies in Sweden manage 
their earnings through a test whereby the distribution of weighted net income of the companies 
will be studied. In order to determine whether earnings management occur we will analyze the 
result through an observation of the distribution of earnings around zero.  
 
The second test in this thesis is build upon the result received in the first test and serves to explain 
factors which may be correlated with the observations which are defined to be managing their 
earnings. This relation will be examined through a statistical test called logistic regression 
analysis, which evaluates if there is a correlation between earnings management and the chosen 
factors in this thesis. The observations in these two tests all meet specific criteria in order for us to 
receive a comparable and fair result as possible. The chosen companies represent the entire 
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population of private limited companies, which have more than 50 employees, are obliged for 
auditing and have provided complete financial information over the last nine years. A further 
discussion of chosen method and explanation of the two tests and the different variables in more 
detail will be made later in this chapter.  
 
3.1 Selection 
To be able to analyze the companies over the last nine years they must meet specific criteria. The 
next table presents the selection process of the companies included in the analysis.   
 
Table 1. Selection of companies and criteria.   
 
 
 
This thesis will analyze 5 341 private limited companies originating from Sweden. The financial 
information from these companies will be collected from the last nine years, i.e. from 2005-2013 
in order to make sure that the analyze includes a whole business cycle which may have an affect 
on the results. The year of 2014 will not be included in this research due to risk of failure to collect 
complete financial information of all relevant private limited Swedish companies for this year. 
This gives us a total of 48 069 observations which will be representing the whole population of 
companies meeting this criteria. The financial information originates from the database Business 
Retriever and the categorization of industries equals the industry classification by SNI (Svensk 
Näringsgrensindelning). Some previous studies have excluded the industry of Bank, finance and 
insurance because of its different regulation and capital structure compared to other industries. 
However, in this study, these sectors will be included because of the fact that studies have shown 
that a more consistent regulation within the industry has a positive correlation with earnings 
management (Healy and Whalen, 1999). Again, to receive the most reliable and fair result, the 
whole population, which meets specific criteria, and not only a sample, will be analyzed.  
 
3.2 Main test  
The first part of the method aims to examine if earnings management exists, however not in what 
way. Therefore, it will be based on the earnings management distribution approach in order to 
identify the companies, which manage their earnings. The method was introduced by Burgstahler 
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and Dichev (1997) with the assumption that earnings were managed to achieve positive results.  
The companies will hereafter be divided into the mentioned 48 069 observations (5 341 companies 
* nine years). To be able to identify these observations which are defined to be managing their 
earnings, criteria must be set up to separate the observations which do not manage their earnings 
from the ones that do. This is made through a subjective judgment, which will be based on the 
same judgment as in said research and explained further in 3.3.1. 
 
The hypothesis for the main test is the following:  
● H1: Private companies manage earnings to avoid reporting a negative net income 
  
3.3 Sub test 
If the hypothesis of the main test is supported we will continue with the next test and answer the 
second research question by examining three factors, which may have a potential association with 
the identified earnings management. The result from the main test is divided into two groups and 
are therefore binary, observations perceived as being managed and observations perceived as not 
being managed. There are different types of regression analysis methods when using binary data 
were the most common ones are binary regression analysis and probit regression. Since this 
population data is large the binary logistic regression analysis is preferable (IDRE, 2015). This 
will test whether there is a relationship between the response variable (Y), which can only be 
categorized into two possible values, and one or more explanatory variables (X). The test is made 
in the statistics program SPSS, were Significance (Sig) and Odds Ratio (Exp B) will be analyzed 
when examining the association between the contributing factors and earnings management. The 
Significance Coefficient determines if the explanatory variables (X) have an effect on the response 
variable (Y). If the coefficient is significant, which is defined as below 0,05 when using a 
confidence interval of 95 %, we can say with certainty that there is no association between the 
variables being tested. Furthermore, we will analyze the results from the Odds Ratio. The Odds are 
defined as the ratio in terms of the probability that earnings management occur in the explanatory 
variable (X) over the probability that earnings management do not occur in that explanatory 
variable (X) (IDRE, 2015). According to Sundén (2015) the Odds Ratio shall be interpreted as the 
odds of finding earnings management in one category in relation to finding earnings management 
in another category. If an Odds Ratio of ≥ 1 is received, these are the odds that earnings 
management is existent within this category compared to all others. If, however, an Odds Ratio of 
< 1 is received, the odds of not finding earnings management within this category is the ratio of 1 
and the Odds Ratio (1/Odds Ratio) compared to all other categories.   
 
Other coefficients, which are common in regression analysis, will not be a part of this thesis 
because of their irrelevance when investigating a big sample (Field, 2013).  
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3.3.1 The response variable 
The test variable will be based on net income, however, because of size differences of the 
companies in this research we will, as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), weigh net income to make 
the companies comparable regardless of the size. Instead of weighting the net income with the 
market value, which is done in their research, we will use turnover, a ratio excluding size and only 
focusing on the company's performance. A specific level in turnover may be interpreted differently 
in companies of different size. This ratio will henceforth in the text be referred to as weighted net 
income, calculated as  
 
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
= 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
 
Furthermore, the following part of this thesis will define observations with a weighted net income 
of zero to five percent (0-5%) as managing their earnings. We use this interval due to a great 
representation within these percentages and the choice is also based on the interval analyzed by 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). They took the main test into further investigation and confirmed 
that most of the companies just above zero in net income did manage their earnings. If the charts 
presented in the result show an abnormal distribution with a higher frequency just above zero, we 
can use this interval for further investigation and test whether our chosen factors may be associated 
with earnings management.  
 
Therefore, in the following tests this binary response variable will be divided into the following 
categories   
 companies with a weighted net income of zero to five percent (0-5 %) will be perceived as  
managing their earnings (green area in Table 2) 
 companies with a weighted net income outside the interval of zero to five percent (<0 % 
and >5 %) will be perceived as not managing their earnings (red area in Table 2)  
 
Table 2. Description of chosen earnings management interval.  
 
 
3.3.2 The explanatory variables 
The dependent variable is set in relation with the following independent variables in a sub test: 
 
 
 
Industry  
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All observations will be categorized into respective industry and the association between earnings 
management and the 28 different industries identified will be examined. Previous research by Sun 
and Rath (2009) found evidence that earnings management was more existent within specific 
industries discussed in the theoretical framework of this thesis. Also, Collins et al. (1995) reports 
on an association between earnings management and industries, which are highly regulated. The 
industries of the companies analyzed in this research have various frequencies, however are all 
essential to include when representing the whole population, which will be analyzed in the result.  
 
 
Table 3. Industry labeling, frequency and percentage of total.  
 
 
 
With this information, the previously mentioned hypothesis will be researched;  
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● H2: There is an association between companies within specific industries and the existence 
of earnings management within these companies 
 
Debt to equity ratio  
This variable tests the level of debt to equity ratio in relation to earnings management, which in 
previous research by Watts el. al. (1986), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) and Deegan (2009) has 
been a factor which has been associated with earnings management. However, the ratio has been 
associated with earnings management in different ways, by having a negative or positive 
correlation.  
 
Therefore, this hypothesis will be researched;  
● H3: Level of debt to equity influence the existence of earnings management  
 
 
Audit firm 
The third factor is tested to observe if the choice of audit firm might have an impact on earnings 
management. Previous research by Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008), DeAngelo (1981) and 
Becker et al. (1998) indicate that companies, which do not use one of the Big Four audit firms, 
manipulate their figures more than those, which do have one of the Big Four firms. However, this 
is not the opinion of Vander Bauwhede et al. (2003), who propose the opposite. The test will 
examine if a conclusion can be made in the case of limited private companies in Sweden as well.  
 
The observations are categorized into the their respective audit firm and Table 4 demonstrates this 
categorization, both on an individual and merged level. The second merged categorization will be 
used in the sub test.  
 
 
Table 4. Audit firm labeling and count.  
 
 
Therefore, the hypothesis is the following;  
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● H4: Type of audit firm influence the existence of earnings management within companies 
 
The following table serves to give a clearer explanation of the different variables and how they are 
classified.  
 
Table 5. Explanation of the variables. 
 
 
3.4 Limitations 
Due to the great number of companies analyzed in this study, we will not be able to collect 
information from individual financial reports, and therefore other factors affecting the existence of 
earnings management will not be analyzed, other than from the information retrievable from 
Business Retriever. This is nonetheless the only data necessary in order to use the chosen method 
with the chosen variables. Due to only observing 5 341 out of a total of 489 080 private Swedish 
companies, the results received in this thesis may not reflect the whole population of private 
companies. However, in order to practice the sub test with companies with audit obligation in this 
population study it is essential to only include companies meeting these criteria.  
 
Due to a greater representation, i.e. larger frequency, of companies within some industries, for 
example Manufacturing, Wholesale and Construction, design and furnishing business the result of 
earnings management within different industries might reflect a misleading picture of this 
correlation. This is taken into account, however, and will not be further analyzed but instead left as 
a proposal for future research. Furthermore, this thesis do not classify audit firms separately but 
instead only separate Big Four from not Big Four audit firms. This investigation is also left for 
future research.  
 
By using weighted net income as the core value when categorizing the interval of earnings 
management, and not for example only net income there is a risk of not receiving a true and fair 
result due to its dependence on turnover. Since the tests of the explanatory variables are dependent 
on the result of the main test a careful interpretation is necessary. However, weighted net income 
takes company size into account and is therefore the fairest measurement. Furthermore, using a 
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continuous variable, as debt to equity ratio, when the outcome can take many different values and 
when the set of data is large complications may appear when estimating the logit model. (IDRE, 
2015) 
4. Results and analysis 
 
This chapter aims to interpret, analyze and conclude the results from the main and sub test and 
analyze them against existing theories and previous research.  The results from these tests will either 
reject or not reject the hypotheses of the existence of earnings management and if the chosen 
factors can explain its existence. 
 
The 48 069 observations which meet the criteria defined in the previous chapter have now been 
examined in the statistics program of SPSS. The two tests described in the method, the main test 
and the sub test, aim to answer our questions were the sub test is dependent on the result received 
in the main test. The observations significant for further research in the sub test will vary 
dependent on their weighted net income, and will not depend on company origin, i.e. a company's 
weighted net income may be included one year but excluded another year.  
4.1 Main test  
The results from the main test, which examine the existence of earnings management, will be 
analyzed in the following two charts, which show the distribution of weighted net income from the 
observations. From the histogram and table we will discuss the results from a statistical point of 
view and from the bar chart we will link previous research to our results and discuss similarities 
and differences. The main focus for discussion will be the distribution just above zero, since our 
method implies that companies managing their earnings place earnings just above zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1. Histogram of the distribution of weighted net income. 
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Table 6. Chart 1 in numbers. 
 
    
The histogram in chart 1 and table 6 present the distribution of observed frequencies of the 
weighted net income compared to “the bell curve” for all nine years and all companies, i.e. 48 069 
observations. The observations are divided into bars with a weighted net income of 1 % with an 
interval of -10 % to +10 %.  Observations outside of this interval of +/-10 % are excluded since the 
importance of the histogram lies in the distribution of companies, which has an abnormal 
frequency around zero. Therefore, the total observations included in the chart above are 37 529. 
We have noticed a large frequency of observations below zero at the weighted net income of -1 %, 
but this lies outside of our method and will therefore be excluded in further analysis in this thesis.  
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The histogram shows an abnormally high frequency of observations just above zero and are 
therefore of interest for our hypothesis. The observations in the histogram have a mean of 2,66, 
which indicate that the majority of the companies end up on the positive side of zero, i.e have a 
positive weighted net income. The skewness shows the direction and degree of asymmetry and is 
in this test negative (-0,426), showing a larger frequency on the right side of zero. The standard 
error of the mean represents how reliable the mean is and in this case the small number of 0,01859 
may indicate that the sample mean is a reliable reflection of the mean of the population. The 
standard deviation of 3,6 shows the spread of the observations with an increasing number as the 
spread of the observation increases. This fairly large number of approx. 3,6 means that these 
values on average are further away from the mean than a lower standard deviation would imply. It 
shows a large variance among the observations, which is logical due to the various levels of 
weighted net income a company can have.   
 
We will now continue by taking a closer look into the distribution irregularity precisely around 
zero in a bar chart, which will also be presented in frequency and percentage in Table 7. The 
highlighted bars and area in the table represent a weighted net income of exactly zero and the 
interval next to zero up to  +/- 1 %. The results will later in this chapter be compared to our chosen 
theories and previous research. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2. Bar chart showing the frequency distribution around zero (% weighted net income)  
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Table 7. The distribution of observations into intervals of 1 % (weighted net income) in 
frequency, percentage and cumulative percentage.  
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Chart 2 and Table 7 aim to represent how the observations of weighted net income distribute 
themselves around zero. The bar in the middle represents a weighted net income of exactly zero. 
Furthermore the highlighted bars represent the frequencies to the left and right of zero which have 
an interval of just above zero respectively just below zero up to +/- 1 %. The frequency of 
companies on the positive side decreases by the time the weighted net income increases. Like the 
previous chart, this bar chart shows an abnormal distribution of weighted net income above zero 
compared to the bar below zero. The irregularity in the distribution around zero are also presented 
in frequencies and percentage to clarify our results. The interval just above zero is three times as 
large with a frequency of 7 201 in comparison to the interval just below zero, which have a 
frequency of 2 332. This result, however, does not necessarily indicate that the all the companies 
with a weighted net income of 1% manage their earnings, but in the case of faithful reporting the 
distribution of frequencies around zero would not have been this high. The irregularity in the 
distribution of earnings supports our hypothesis that private limited companies manage their 
earnings in order to avoid reporting a negative net income.  
 
The hypothesis which is based on previous research and theories is therefore of interest when 
analyzing the main result. The presented results from using earnings distribution method 
strengthen the valid studies made by Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Both 
studies show an abnormally high amount of companies with a positive weighted net income and a 
diversion in the distribution around zero, with a concentration of companies just above zero and 
fewer just below zero, which they also define as companies managing their earnings. The proposal 
that companies which have earnings on the edge of zero, as in risking falling below the point of 
zero earnings have more incentives to manage their earnings than other companies is what also can 
be observed in this study. The result in the previous research that 30-40 % of the companies adapt 
their numbers between two periods to cross the “red line” can help us explain the frequencies just 
above zero in this thesis. The specific evidence of this thesis is shown in the distribution 
irregularity around zero, which definitely corresponds with the conclusions made in this theory.     
 
The main results can only give an indication that some earnings have been managed, but to what 
extent is unclear. However, whatever definition of the result used, this thesis show a positive 
correlation with the Mechanistic Hypothesis, that investors may be wrongly informed by the 
judgment of a company's accounting methods. Furthermore we can also strengthen the theories 
that already exist and have been described. The threshold theory is explicitly clear in our test 
results with the explanation that companies manage their earnings to report a positive net income. 
It becomes even clearer when referring to the theory of “crossing the red line” which is in this case 
means placing earnings just above zero. The overrepresentation of companies just above zero can 
also be explained by the prospect theory which implies that companies will receive the greatest 
utility when crossing a reference point of a net income at zero and less utility through a gain 
without a reference point, for example a move from one positive net income to another. Also, the 
observed diversion around zero in the results differs from the smoothness which would be existent 
if earnings management had not occurred, according to the approach of pooled cross-sectional 
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distribution. This is also consistent with the Scandinavian studies by Reksten and Kristiansen 
(2011) and Sundgren (2007), which interpret that earnings management occur to overcome small 
losses. Furthermore, the very low frequency of a weighted net income of zero do not correspond 
with previous research by Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003) on companies wanting to show 
a zero result in order to avoid profit tax but instead as we mentioned, the majority of the 
observations have “crossed the red line”, which corresponds with the threshold theory. 
 
With this information, the first hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating that  
● H1: Private companies manage earnings to avoid reporting a negative net income 
 
4.2 Sub test 
The main test has provided enough proof of the existence of earnings management and therefore it 
is essential to continue this analysis by affiliating the companies that manage their earnings with 
the chosen factors, which may affect this existence. Explained in the method, the following part of 
this thesis will define observations with a weighted net income of 0-5 % as managing their 
earnings. We use this interval due to a great representation within these percentages and also based 
on the interval analyzed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). The result in their research proceeds 
from a significance level of 1 % and our results are based on a confidence interval of 95 %, i.e. 
having a significance level of 5 %. The level of significance of each sub category within the 
variables is dependent on the confidence interval and will exclude observations, which do not fit 
into this interval for further analysis. The observations, which are significant, will be examined for 
their association with earnings management by using the Odds Ratio (Exp B). Furthermore, the 
different factors are tested together in the logistic regression analysis but the results will be 
discussed separately since they do not depend on each other. Observations from the same company 
may be defined to be managing their earnings one year but will be excluded another year, all 
dependent on their yearly weighted net income and not company origin.  
 
4.2.1 Industry 
All companies over the last nine years have been categorized into industries according to Swedish 
industry categorization (SNI) and are presented below in alphabetical order with significance 
(green) or no significance (white) and their respective Odds Ratio in relation to earnings 
management and count.     
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Table 8. Industry categorization and their significance, odds ratio, beta coefficient and count 
(Binary Logistic Regression Analysis).  
 
 
 
 
Out of 28 industries being tested, seven of them had a higher significance level than 0,05 which 
implies that there is no significant association between the following seven industries and earnings 
management; Banking, finance and insurance, Business services, Education, science and 
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development, Hair and beauty, Health and healthcare, Manufacturing and industry, Staffing and 
employment and Wholesale. They will therefore be excluded in further analysis. The green 
highlighted industries all have a significance level between 0,000-0,050 and are therefore 
significant for the sub test and will be analyzed further in Table 9 together with their Odds Ratio in 
order of size. The relation between earnings management and industries as a whole is also 
significant, shown in the last row with a significance of 0,000.  
 
The next table presents the significant industries and their association with earnings management 
in order of size of Odds Ratio and an analysis of the results. A possible relation between Odds 
Ratio and count will also be interpreted.  
 
Table 9. Significant industries, categorized in positive and negative correlation with earnings 
management (Binary Logistic Regression Analysis). 
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The table shows how the significant industries are associated with earnings management. Out of 
21 significant industries, twelve had a positive association with earnings management and nine had 
a positive association with no earnings management. The Odds Ratio is interpreted as the odds of 
finding earnings management in one category in relation to finding earnings management in the 
industry of reference (in this case all other industries). This means that each industry has been 
compared to the overall effect, i.e. all other industries, to find the existence of earnings 
management in one specific industry. The ratio of industries with a positive association with 
earnings management equals the odds of finding earnings management within this industry 
compared to all others. The ratio of industries with a positive association with no earnings 
management shall be interpreted as 1/Odds Ratio, which equals the odds of not finding earnings 
management within this industry compared to all others.  
 
The industry with a higher ratio than the rest, was Other consumer services with a small frequency 
of thirteen out of the total population of 5 431 companies. Its Odds Ratio of 3,318 means that the 
odds are 3,318 times larger of finding earnings management within this industry compared to all 
other industries. In Other consumer services the following industries are included; Washing 
activities, Undertaking business and Body care. This industry only represents 0.2 % of all 
companies, which makes it problematic to interpret a reliable relation between the companies 
within this industry and companies managing their earnings. However, the study by Sun and Rath 
(2009) also finds an association between the industry of Healthcare and earnings management, 
also implying that these companies are often small and less profitable, which also may be an 
explanation of the results of a high Odds Ratio in this industry.  
 
The industries of Technical consultancy, Computer, IT and telecommunication and Media are 
second, third and fourth from the top with an Odds Ratio of 2,266, 1,970 and 1,818 and a 
frequency of 114 and 269, respectively. This also strengthens the conclusion the Australian study 
by Sun and Rath (2009) made which implied that industries within the periphery sector such as 
Telecommunication and IT had a greater representation of earnings management than others.  
 
On the contrary, the results show that the industries of Public administration and community and 
Legal, accounting and consulting have the smallest odds out of all industries to manage their 
earnings. These Odds Ratios of 0,183 of 0,289 mean that the odds are 5,464 (1/0,183) and 3,460 
(1/0,289) higher that earnings management does not exist within these industries compared to all 
others. The explanation for the odds of these industries may be due to the principle of public 
access to official documents in Sweden, since the asymmetric relationship between stakeholders 
and this industry may probably be less visible. Compared to the research by Healy and Whalen 
(1999), which imply that highly regulated industries such as Bank, finance and insurance would 
manage their earnings more than others, these results show the opposite. Another reason for this 
result may be that previous studies have examined companies in other countries where the culture, 
regulation systems and accounting standards are different from Sweden. 
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However, no relation between count and insignificant industries has been observed. The various 
frequencies of the insignificant industries are 164, 124, 127, 2, 184, 1186, 90 and 577 and show no 
relation to one another but instead represent an equal distribution of different frequencies. 
Furthermore, no relation between count and level of Odds Ratio can be found in the significant 
industries. This is instead left to be researched further in the future.  
 
Based on this information we can indicate that there is a larger probability that companies within 
some industries manage their earnings than others and therefore support the hypothesis of 
 
● H2: There is an association between companies within specific industries and the 
existence of earnings management within these companies 
 
4.2.2 Debt to equity ratio 
The second variable, debt to equity ratio, is analyzed according to the same method as industry; 
through a binary logistic regression analysis to find an eventual association between level of debt 
to equity ratio and earnings management. The companies, which are defined to be managing their 
earnings, are affiliated with their respective ratio and a possible association is to be found. The 
following table shows the association between companies managing their earnings and their 
respective debt to equity ratio in order to find a possible significance.  
 
Table 10. Debt to equity ratio, significance and odds ratio (Binary Logistic Regression 
Analysis).  
 
 
 
 
The association between companies managing their earnings and their level of debt to equity ratio 
showed no existing significance. Its significance of 0,553 does not fit into the interval of 0,000 and 
0,050 in which it would have been defined as significant. The variable of debt to equity is 
continuous and this large interval of possible ratios may be the explanation of this non-existent 
significance mentioned in method limitations when using this logit model (IDRE, 2015). Previous 
research in this area is contradictory and a pattern has not been observed on the actual relation 
between earnings management and debt to equity ratio. The result received can therefore not 
strengthen the theoretical framework already existent in this area. Our research fails to show any 
proof of the relationship between debt to equity ratio and our categorization of companies 
managing their earnings.  
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Therefore, we can neither reject nor not reject this hypothesis, and this thesis does not find 
evidence enough to support the following hypothesis; 
● H3: Level of debt to equity influence the existence of earnings management  
  
4.2.3 Audit firm 
The last variable to examine is the association between audit firm and companies managing their 
earnings by using binary variables. This will firstly be demonstrated in Table 10, showing the 
Significance and Odds Ratio of the relation between companies managing their earnings and their 
type of audit firm. The observations, which manage their earnings, have been categorized into 
having a Big Four audit firm or not. 
 
Table 11. Significant Audit Firm Categorization (Binary Logistic Regression Analysis).  
 
 
  
 
The association is significant and therefore it is essential to analyze the Odds Ratio, which in this 
case is 0.753, a fairly low number compared to the larger numbers in the industry variable test. 
This Odds Ratio implies that the odds are 0,753 times larger that earnings management is existent 
in companies not using a Big Four audit firm compared to the companies, which use a Big Four 
audit firm. Next, the result will be demonstrated in a crosstab showing the association between 
companies managing their earnings and their audit firm.  
 
Table 12. Crosstab of earnings management and audit firm.  
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This crosstab shows that there are more companies managing their earnings with a not Big Four 
audit firm than a Big Four audit firm. All numbers associated with this result are highlighted and 
all have a higher percentage of association than their counterparts, i.e. the relation of earnings 
management and Big Four audit firm.  
 
According to some previous research, companies, which do not have one of the Big Four audit 
firms, associate themselves with earnings management in a larger extent (Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2008; DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et al., 1998), which was also the result in this test. 
However, there is also research which imply the opposite, that this correlation does not exist 
(Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003) Compared to the research by Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) 
and Burgstahler et al. (2006), with audit firm information retrieved we have been able to come to a 
conclusion in this area. The Big Four audit firms have the resources and specialists competences 
and of course, their reputation at stake as incentives to be more careful when controlling the 
financial reports (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008). This conclusion is consistent with Reksten and 
Kristiansen (2011), that companies managing their earnings do not use a Big Four audit firm.  
 
From the results received, we find proof to support the hypothesis of 
● H4: Type of audit firm influence the existence of earnings management within 
companies 
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5.  Discussion 
 
This chapter aims to combine the purpose, method and results and interpret the possible reasons 
of the results. 
    
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether earnings management exists in Swedish 
private limited companies and factors, which have an effect on its existence. The theoretical 
framework consists of theories and studies all indicating that earnings management exists in 
companies for different and several reasons. With this in mind the method of earnings distribution 
was chosen for the main test, which provide information regarding the existence of earnings 
management. From the distribution of earnings a significant conclusion can be made, there is an 
overrepresentation of earnings just above zero and these observations have some sort of 
association with type of industry. Also, these observations are associated with a not Big Four audit 
firm but no relation between earnings management and level of debt to equity could be found. 
These conclusions have also been made in previous research, however the results vary. The 
probable explanations to these tendencies are that companies avoid reporting negative results, 
partly due to the want to survive and partly due to pressure from stakeholders. The results received 
are essential to highlight due to their controversy in business society and they add to the less 
researched area of earnings management in private companies. 
  
The chosen method introduced by Hayn (1995) and developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
has provided results based solely on income. If instead using the Jones model, other ways to 
manage earnings would have been reported, however, the same results would in the end be 
received no matter which method used. This earnings distribution model has however provided 
results consistent with previous studies. The threshold theory and the prospect theory together with 
previous research have been the theoretical basis, which we have used to support the results 
received. In order to come to a valid and fair conclusion, all industries and a whole business cycle 
have been included, however, the subjective judgment of defining companies with a weighted net 
income of 0-5 % as managing their earnings has lead us to a result, which under other 
assumptions, limitations and criteria would have been different, even if using the same method. 
The results received are especially consistent with research made in other Scandinavian countries 
by Reksten and Kristiansen (2011) and Sundgren (2007), saying that earnings are managed to 
overcome small losses and that companies which manage their earnings do not use a Big Four 
audit firm (Reksten and Kristiansen, 2011). If there is an existing trend among adjacent countries 
is unclear and a generalization of these results may not suitable due to the limited supply of 
previous research in this area, even though there is a similar environment in these countries. 
Furthermore, the results of this thesis cannot be applied to other countries with different 
environments and regulation systems. There are also results received, which cannot fully be 
explained by the theories presented, for example the theory of receiving a zero result to avoid 
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profit tax, since the results did not show on a significant frequency of observations with a 
weighted net income of zero.  
  
The main test has provided coherent and satisfying results consistent with previous research, 
especially with research by Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), which analyzed a 
similar amount of observations and found a similar pattern of earnings distribution. However, the 
sub test has not shown an as clear association between companies managing their earnings and the 
chosen factors. The observations of the factors of industry, debt to equity ratio and audit firm have 
opened up for further analysis. The assumption that companies within some industries manage 
their earnings in a larger extent than others is a conclusion exclusive to this thesis. The argument 
that some industries were perceived to be managing their earnings was supported by previous 
research, and some were not. This conclusion appears to be dependent on the respective frequency 
of observations within the industries, however no relation in this area was found. The Australian 
study made by Sun and Rath (2009) did come to the same conclusion as we did that companies 
included in the periphery sector manage their earnings by increasing their earnings to overcome a 
zero net income. Even though the Australian study used an accrual based method for the main test 
we did come to the same conclusion. The same authors also support our results that earnings 
management is more existent in small and medium sized companies with low profits. Moving on 
to the debt to equity area, the choice of not converting the different levels of debt to equity ratio 
into a binary variable in the test may have contributed to its non-existing significance even though 
previous research is contradictory. It is possible that a significant association could have been 
received if the values had been categorized into two levels; a high and low debt to equity ratio. 
Also, this non-association may be explained by the various industries and the different conditions 
of capital structure within these industries, and another result may have been received if using 
industry as a control variable in this part of the test. Regarding the association between audit firm 
and earnings management, the equal distribution of companies within the two groups, the Odds 
Ratio of 0,753 and the small percentage difference between the two audit firm types presented in 
the crosstab, all together demonstrate a very small disparity between the two in auditors´ mission 
to prevent management of earnings.      
  
This thesis has contributed with a critical investigation to society in order to provide a basis for 
future research and to make generalizable conclusions in the area of earnings management and its 
contributing factors. This research will help stakeholders being more observant and be able to 
make better decisions based on more information, concerning how companies think in their way of 
presenting their financial reports. The most distinctive results show a need for business society to 
critically question the validity of financial reports and for companies to observe that there 
sometimes is a thin line between flexible accounting methods and fraud. Auditors and managers 
may further analyze the results from different perspectives in order to ensure that presented 
financial statements are reliable, both before and after publication. However, they must take into 
account other factors and incentives which may motivate companies to manage earnings and 
present untruthful financial statements.    
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6. Conclusion 
 
This section will conclude the main results of this thesis together with proposals for future 
research.  
 
Through this thesis, we have been able to prove the existence of earnings management among 5 
341 private limited Swedish companies through an earnings distribution method. This exclusive 
population study with more than 48 000 observations over the last nine years has provided 
significant results as a complement to existing research. It has also evaluated the correlation 
between earnings management and characteristics of these companies, as in industry, debt to 
equity ratio and choice of audit firm. We find an existence of earnings management among the 
companies analyzed in form of an unexpected and irregular distribution of weighted net income 
around zero. We also find a positive association between earnings management and industry as a 
whole and within specific industries, no significance in the debt to equity ratio area and a positive 
correlation between earnings management and audit firm, showing that companies using a Big 
Four audit firm manage their earnings in less extent.   
 
With the results received, we want to make some proposals for future research in this area. To be 
able to make an even more generalizable conclusion, it is essential to evaluate the impact other 
intervals of the definition of earnings management would have on the result by developing a 
sensitivity test. By using a weighted net income interval of for example 0-10 % or (-5)-(5) % other 
results would probably be received. Also, research may be made in the area of the change in 
earnings management over a period of time, analyzing if the same companies manage their 
earnings each year or if these is an even spread of earnings management among the companies 
every year. Regarding the explanatory variables, the association between significance and 
frequency among the industries can be further investigated and evaluated in order to not reject 
significant industries wrongly. To contribute even more to existing research it is important to look 
into individual audit firms and their prevention of earnings management by evaluating them 
separately (EY, KPMG, PWC and Deloitte). There is also more research possible with this data in 
the capital structure area and its effect on earnings management, as in converting the debt to equity 
ratios into a binary variable, for example into high and low debt to equity ratio to observe an even 
more distinct connection.    
 
The main findings of this thesis are proof found on an existence of earnings management by 
companies in order to overcome a zero result and thus receive more utility when moving from a 
loss to a gain in relation to a reference point, in this case a weighted net income of zero.    
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